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NOTES
SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE IN
NEW MEXICO
The separation of powers doctrine is necessary because of the
political truth that the accumulation of all governmental powers
in the same hands can lead to tyranny.' Properly applied, the doctrine is a valid and useful means of preventing the exercise of unchecked power, 2 and is an aid to the efficient organization of government.' However, when the doctrine is intrepreted strictly, applied mechanically, and viewed as
an end in itself, the results can
5
be artificial 4 or actually harmful.
Under a strict interpretation of the doctrine, each governmental
function is classified as legislative, or executive, or judicial. Once
labeled, the function must be performed by that branch of the government having the same name. Such a classification is untenable.6
There is "no high wall or demarkation between governmental departments. Necessarily they gradually merge and blend into each
other." 7 For example, the assessment of lands for tax purposes has
been labeled ministerial,8 legislative,9 and judicial'" by the same
court." In the past, divorces were granted only by the legislature, 2
but now only the courts grant them.' In the future, it is possible that
1. The Federalist No. 47, at 245 (Everyman's Library ed. 1948) (Madison).
2. Jaffe & Nathanson, Administrative Law 38 (1961).
3. Ibid.; see also Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation
of Powers", 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 385, 397 (1935).
4. See Comment, 3 Natural Resources J. 178 (1963).
5. See Davis, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in West Virginia-A
Study in Separation of Powers, 44 W. Va. L. Rev. 270, 371 (1938) ; 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§ 2.10, 2.12 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Davis] (unfavorable
comment on State ex rel. Hovey Concrete Prods. Co. v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250, 316
P.2d 1069 (1957)).
6. In re Beasley Bros., 206 Iowa 229, 220 N.W. 306 (1928) ; State ex rel. Hillis
v. Sullivan, 48 Mont. 320, 330, 137 Pac. 392, 395 (1913) (no such thing as absolute
independence). See generally 1 Davis § 1.09. But see Charleston & Southside Bridge
Co. v. County Court, 41 W. Va. 658, 24 S.E. 1002 (1896) (court used a dictionary to
label a function).
7. In re Beasley Bros., supra at 233, 220 N.W. at 308.
8. Pittsburg, Cincinnati & St. Louis Ry. v. Board of Pub. Works, 28 W. Va. 264
(1886).
9. Mackin v. County Clerk, 38 W. Va. 338, 18 S.E. 632 (1893).
10. Wheeling Bridge & Terminal Ry. v. Paull, 39 W. Va. 142, 19 S.E. 551 (1894).
11. See Davis, op. cit. supra note 5, at 273-74.
12. Jaffe & Nathanson, op. cit. supra note 2, at 3.
13. Ibid.
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divorces might be granted by administrative agencies. Even if
functions could be permanently and uniquely classified, it would be
impractical to absolutely prohibit one governmental branch from
exercising any function assigned to either of the other two branches.
"Blending" of governmental functions is commonplace today.' 4
The truth is that a complete separation of governmental functions
is an abstraction which cannot be put into practice. 5
The unworkability of a strict interpretation of the doctrine is
most conspicuous when applied to administrative agencies.' 6 In
view of the complexity of modern life, administrative agencies are
necessary if many governmental tasks are to be performed efficiently.' 7 Most agencies are effective because they do perform more
than one of the three classical functions of government.' 8 Since
agencies are necessary, they must be permitted to operate effectively.
But, since most agencies combine functions, they cannot be allowed
to operate under a strict interpretation of the separation of powers
doctrine. In states where the strict interpretation prevails, courts
14. See e.g., State v. Illinois Cent. R. R. Co., 246 Ill. 188, 92 N.E. 814 (1910)
(agency adjusts railroad's gross receipts) ; In re Beasley Bros., 206 Iowa 229, 220 N.W.
306 (1928) (commission decides facts and grants bus line permit) ; Craig v. O'Rear,
199 Ky. 553, 251 S.W. 828 (1923) (legislature appoints members of school commission) ; State ex rel. Hillis v. Sullivan, 48 Mont. 320, 137 Pac. 392 (1913) (commission appoints court attendants); Ross v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 69 N.J.L.
291, 55 At. 310 (Sup. Ct. 1903) (court appoints Public Park Commissioners) ; Miami
County v. Dayton, 92 Ohio St. 215, 110 N.E. 726 (1915) (conservancy legislation upheld; quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions constitutional) ; Fairview v.
Griffee, 73 Ohio St. 183, 76 N.E. 865 (1905) (judiciary implements statute allowing
land to be detached from village) ; Bailey v. Board of Pub. Affairs, 194 Okla. 495,
153 P.2d 235 (1944) (agency reorganizes penal system) ; Trybulshi v. Bellows Falls
Hydro-Elec. Corp., 112 Vt. 1, 20 A.2d 117 (1941) (Public Service Commission performs
judicial function) ; Sabre v. Rutland R.R. Co., 86 Vt. 347, 85 At. 693 (1913) (statute
creating Board of Railroad Commissioners constitutional) ; Wheeling Bridge & T. Ry.
Co. v. Paull, 39 W. Va. 142, 19 S.E. 551 (1894) ; Brinnegar v. Clark, 371 P.2d 62
(Wyo. 1962) (fire marshal finds defendant guilty of a misdemeanor).
15. Davis, op. cit. supra note 5, at 369.
16. The doctrine is no longer invoked when other obvious "blendings of functions"
situations arise. See, e.g., State ex rel. Chapman v. Truder, 35 N.M. 49, 289 Pac. 594
(1930) (doctrine applies to state, not local, governments) ; Annot., 67 A.L.R. 737, 740
(1930) (doctrine does not apply to commission or city manager type of municipal
governments) ; Annot., 50 A.L.R. 42, 44 (1927) (declaratory judgments) ; Annot., 26
A.L.R. 399 (1923)
(judicial suspension of sentence not encroachment on executive
branch).
17. 1 Davis § 1.05.
18. "The very identifying badge of the modern administrative agency has become the combination of judicial power (adjudication) with legislative power (rule
making)." 1 Davis § 1.09 at 68.
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either declare specific agency actions to be unconstitutional 19 or use
legal fictions to avoid the doctrine.2 0
Article 3, section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution provides:
The powers of government of this state are divided into three
distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial, and no
person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any
powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this
Constitution otherwise expressly directed or permitted.
The New Mexico Supreme Court, judging by some of its recent
decisions, 2' has strictly construed this provision to require complete
separation of governmental powers and functions. However, courts
in other jurisdictions have interpreted similar constitutional provisions to mean something less than complete separation. 2 It seems
unlikely that the New Mexico Supreme Court will abandon its
interpretation. Therefore, if the state is to have a workable separation of powers doctrine, article 3, section 1 of the New Mexico
Constitution should be amended.

HISTORICAL SUMMARY
Most authorities trace the separation of powers doctrine back
to Aristotle and find support for the doctrine in the writings of
Polybius, Cicero, Machiavelli, Harrington, Locke, and Montesquieu, among others.2 It is apparent that the doctrine was well
known to the authors of the United States Constitution. Madison,
in what is still the best essay on the American concept of the doctrine, said that the theory
19. State ex rel. Hovey Concrete Prods. Co. v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069
(1957).
20. Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 373 P.2d 809
(1962).
21. Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, supra note 20; State ex rel.
Hovey Concrete Prods. Co. v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069 (1957).
22. See cases cited in note 14 supra.
23. See 1 Davis § 1.09, at 64; Sharp, op. cit. supra note 3. But see Parker, The
Historic Basis of Administrative Law: Separation of Powers and Judicial Supremacy,
12 Rutgers L. Rev. 449, 451, 481 (1958), for a refreshing criticism of the attempt to
trace the doctrine back to antiquity.
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could amount to no more than this, that where the whole power of
one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the
whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of
24
a free constitution are subverted.

It is an undisputed fact that in the United States, governmental
power is divided into three major departments: the legislative, the
executive, and the judicial.2 5 The federal and state constitutions
establish this broad tripartite division, explicitly or implicitly.2 6 The
constitutions of ten states follow the federal plan and do not have
an explicit "distribution of powers" clause .2 Four states have explicit clauses using language almost identical to the language in
New Mexico's constitution. 2 s Nineteen states' constitutions use
comparable language. 29 Eight do not provide for exceptions to the
separation of powers clause.30 Two states' constitutions, while providing for exceptions, mention an "administrative" department as
a part of the executive. 1 The New York constitution is unique in
that, while it follows the federal scheme of providing separately
for each branch of government, it sets up something called the
"Officers and Civil Departments" which might be a fourth branch. 2
Rhode Island, and possibly South Dakota, are unusual in that they
do not specifically prohibit the exercise of powers "properly belong24. The Federalist No. 47, at 247 (Everyman's Library ed. 1948) (Madison).
25. "As in other instances, it seems not unlikely that the chance preference of our
branch of the race for the number three has influenced the development of the doctrine." Sharp, op. cit. supra note 3, at 387 n. 10.
26. Jaffe & Nathanson, op. cit. supra note 2, at 33.
27. Alaska; Delaware; Hawaii; Kansas; North Carolina; North Dakota; Ohio;
Pennsylvania; South Carolina; Washington; Wisconsin.
28. Compare N.M. Const. art. 3, § 1, with Idaho Const. art 2, § 1; Iowa Const.
art. 3, § 1; Utah Const. art. 5, § 1; and Wyo. Const. art 2, § 1.
29. Ariz. Const. art. 3; Ark. Const. art. 4, §§ 1, 2; Cal. Const. art. 3; Colo. Const.
art. 3; Fla. Const. art. 2; Ga. Const. art. 1, § 2-123; Ill.
Const. art. 3; Ky. Const. § 27;
La. Const. art. 2, §§ 1, 2; Me. Const. art. 3, §§ 1, 2; Mich. Const. art. 4, §§ 1, 2; Minn.
Const. art. 3; Mo. Const. art. 2; Mont. Const. art. 4, § 1; Neb. Const. art. 3; Nev.
Const. art. 3; Okla. Const. art. 4, § 1; Tenn. Const. art. 2, §81, 2; Tex. Const. art.

2, § 1.

30. Ala. Const. art. 3; Conn. Const. art. 2; Md. Const. art. 8; Miss. Const. art.
1; N.J. Const. art. 3; Vt. Const. ch. 2, § 5; Va. Const. art. 3; W. Va. Const. art. 5,
§1.
31. Ind. Const. art. 3, Ore. Const. art. 3 is substantially identical and provides:
The powers of Government shall be divided into three seperate [sic]
departments, the Legislative, the Executive, including the administrative, and
the Judicial; and no person charged with official duties under one of these
departments, shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as in this
Constitution expressly provided.
32. N.Y. Const. art. 5.
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ing" to one branch by a co-ordinate department.33 Massachusetts
probably has the strongest worded provision." And New Hampshire
uses the most delightful, and perhaps the most sensible, language. 5
There is no doubt that each of the three major departments was
meant to have, and does have, a central group of functions to perform.3 ' Nor is there any doubt that the separation of powers doctrine has validity in every state. However, courts differ in applying
the theory. They tend either towards the Madisonian interpretation3 7 or towards a more mechanical, doctrinal approach (e.g., New
Mexico). 3 8 It is doubtful whether the particular scheme used in a
state's constitution has any effect upon how its courts apply the doctrine. 9 Some states have no trouble with the doctrine,40 while in
other states, the courts seem to have a great deal of difficulty. 41 It
seems clear that the majority use the more realistic, workable
Madisonian interpretation.42
II
PROBLEMS IN NEW MEXICO

The strict interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine
followed in New Mexico presents two immediate problems: (1)
classifying functions, and (2) blending functions, i.e., one branch
performing functions usually assigned to one of the other two
branches.
33. S.D. Const. art. 2; R. I. Const. art. 3: "The powers of the government shall
be distributed into three departments: the legislative, executive, and judicial."
34.
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall
never exercise the executive and judicial powers or either of them: the
executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of
them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers,
or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men.
Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. 30.
35.
In the government of this state, the three essential powers thereof, to wit,
the legislative, executive, and judicial, ought to be kept as separate from,
and independent of, each other, as the nature of free government will admit,
or as is consistent with that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric
of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of union and amity.
N.H. Const. pt. 1,§ 37.
36. See Jaffe & Nathanson, op. cit. supra note 2 at 33.
37. See, e.g., cases cited in note 14 supra.
38. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hovey Concrete Prods. Co. v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250,
316 P.2d 1069 (1957).
39. Jaffe & Nathanson, op. cit. supra note 2, at 36.
40. See Merrill, The Administrative Law of Oklahoma, 4 Okla. L. Rev. 286 (1951).
41. See Davis, op. cit. supra note 5.
42. 1 Davis § 1.05, at 44.
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History, tradition, or just plain logic assigns certain functions
to each of the three classical American branches of government.
However,
in many instances where there is pressure for the transfer of old or
the creation of new functions or for the better implementation of old
implications of the [strict interpretation] principle
ones, the logical
43
are conflicting.
In other words, some new functions are difficult to classify, 44 while
others should be reclassified.45 The logical consequence of the
classification process demanded by the strict interpretation would be
to freeze the governmental structure and prevent any increase in
efficiency through governmental reorganization.
The classification problem most often arises when the court has
to reconcile the practical necessity of allowing an agency to adjudicate with the requirement of the strict interpretation principle that
an agency can perform only legislative functions. For example, in
Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n,46 the New Mexico Supreme Court said that the protection of correlative rights was
a properly delegated legislative function. A strong argument can
be made that such protection is primarily the adjudication of disputes between private parties,4 7 which is usually classified as a
judicial function. 8 The New Mexico court used a legal fiction to
label adjudication as a legislative function. But the result of the
court's artificial reasoning was correct since it left the complex
subject of correlative rights to an expert administrative body. In
Consolidated Gas Util. Corp. v. Thompson, 49 an early Texas case,
the court carried the strict interpretation principle to its logical
conclusion. It held that where only correlative rights were involved,
the dispute was between private litigants and was to be settled by
the judicial branch. 50 But the result of the Texas court's logical
43. Jaffe & Nathanson, op. cit. supra note 2, at 38.
44. See, e.g., Continental Oil Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 70 N.M. 310, 373
P.2d 809 (1962) (correlative rights).
45. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hovey Concrete Prods. Co. v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250,
316 P.2d 1069 (1957) (workmen's compensation case).
46. 70 N.M. 310, 318, 373 P.2d 809, 814 (1962).
47. See, e.g., Comment, 3 Natural Resources J. 178 (1963).
48. See State ex rel. Hovey Concrete Prods. Co. v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d
1069 (1957).
49. 14 F. Supp. 318 (W.D. Tex. 1936).
50. Id. at 327. But see Railroad Comm'n v. Sterling Oil & Ref. Co., 147 Tex. 547,
218 S.W.2d 415 (1949) (agency can protect correlative rights).
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application of the strict interpretation principle was unworkable. 5
In contrast to these cases, a West Virginia court, using a more realistic interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine, has said:
The ascertainment of values for assessment purposes is a judicial
function, strictly belonging to the legislative or administrativebranch
of the state government .... 5
The New Mexico court could have decided the Continental case
without using a legal fiction by merely recognizing that the determination of correlative rights is a judicial function which can
properly belong to the legislative branch. Unfortunately the court's
interpretation of article 3, section 1 of the constitution prevented
such a straightforward approach.
The question of blending functions is interrelated with the problem of classification. Assuming for the purpose of discussion that
functions can be uniquely classified, the strict interpretation principle
prohibits one branch of the government from performing any function classified as belonging to one of the other two branches. This
is unrealistic and impractical. In fact, examples of blended functions
are numerous.5 Many municipal governments exercise all three
functions. 5 4 The strict interpretation has never been applied to the
pardoning power of the Governor (executive using judicial
power) ;15 or to the Legislature's adjudication of teacher tenure,5 6
or to the Legislature's right to revoke a professional engineer's
license.5 7 Under the "distribution of powers" provision in the New
Mexico constitution, the supreme court has permitted the Corporation Commission to perform all three functions.5 s The most obvious
example of blending functions is the court itself, since no one can
deny that much of our law is judge made. 9
Actually, the prohibition against the blending of functions is applied by the court only when reviewing the actions of administrative
51. Railroad Comm'n v. Sterling Oil & Ref. Co., supra note 50; Corzelius v. Harrell, 186 S.W.2d 961 (Sup. Ct. Tex. 1945). These cases say that the Railroad Commission can issue orders based solely on correlative rights which is now Texas law.
52. Charleston & S. Bridge Co. v. Kanawha County Court, 41 W. Va. 658, 681, 24
S.E. 1002, 1011 (1896) (separate opinion). (Emphasis added.)
53. See the cases cited in note 14 suLpra.
54. State ex rel. Chapman v. Truder, 35 N.M. 49, 289 Pac. 594 (1930).
55. State v. Magee Pub. Co., 29 N.M. 455, 224 Pac. 1028 (1924).
56. McCormick v. Board of Educ., 58 N.M. 648, 274 P.2d 299 (1954).
57. Halfield v. Board of Registration, 60 N.M. 242, 290 P.2d 1077 (1955).
58. In re Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 37 N.M. 194, 20 P.2d 918 (1933).
59. Jaffe & Nathanson, Administrative Law 3 (1961).
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agencies. The court seems to be trapped by a syllogism based on the
cfr;ne_ Th
..
strict interpretation of the separ-tio of powcro
syllogism is (a) blerldidhg of functions is prohibited; (b) if a legislative agency .; allowed to perform a function, the function must be
classificd as legislative; and (c) therefore, a court must either limit
its scope of review of agency action to avoid the danger of having
the judiciary perform a legislative function, or decide that the
function is judicial and not a proper agency action. This syllogism
so impressed the New Mexico Supreme Court in State ex rel. Hovey
Concrete Prods. Co. v. Mechem, 60 that it held a Workmen's Compensation Board could not adjudicate workmen's compensation cases.
This decision has been criticized by administrative law authorities."'
These critics were perhaps too harsh, since they failed to appreciate
that the court was caught in a syllogistic trap. In the court's view,
workmen's compensation cases have to be closely supervised by the
judiciary; but such supervision cannot be provided through judicial
review since the necesary scope of review requires the court to
substitute its judgment for that of the Workmen's Compensation
Board. The court believed this to mean that the judiciary would
perform a legislative function. 2 In contrast, in Continental, the
court apparently believed it was necessary to leave the protection
of correlative rights to the Oil Conservation Commission. To
satisfy the strict interpretation syllogism, the court had to use a
legal fiction.63
III
PROPOSED SOLUTION

In modern context the separation of powers doctrine is used to
64
prevent administrative agencies from exercising unchecked power.
The court, using its general power of review, should act as a policeman to prevent the development of petty, bureaucratic tyrannies.
The court can use the separation of powers doctrine as a policeman's
nightstick.
60. 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069 (1957).
61. "One state court has rendered the astounding holding that the legislature cannot confer state-wide judicial power upon a workmen's compensation commission." 1
Davis § 2.12, at 132.
62. State ex rel. Hovey Concrete Prods. Co. v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250, 316 P,2d
1069 (1957) (by implication).
63. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.

64. See 1 Davis § 1.09, at 68.
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The problems created by the separation of powers doctrine recult from the court'o ;nterprctation, not from

the doctrine itself.

If the doctrine is properly interpreted, the
provision for keeping departments of government separate does not
mean an absolute separation of functions; for if it did, it would

really mean that we are to have no government, where as our Constitution was ordained for the establishment of efficient government . . .65

In other words, the doctrine does not require the absolute separation of functions. The strict interpretation is based on the court's
failure to differentiate between a function and a power. A power is
a function exercised with finality. Adjudication is a judicial function.
Adjudication with finality is a judicial power. The legislative branch
can adjudicate. But a proper interpretation of the separation of
powers doctrine requires that only the judiciary branch of government adjudicate with finality; this it does through the established
procedures of judicial review.
Recognition of the difference between a power and a function
would eliminate the need for artificial reasoning. Use of labels such
as "quasi-judicial," "ministerial act," and "quasi-legislative," would
not be necessary. There would be no reason to engage in verbal
acrobatics in order to use a euphemism for a well-known function.
Such verbal contortions are as logical as calling a duck a quasi-duck
and therefore a chicken in order to allow chicken merchants to
handle ducks. A duck is not a chicken because it is called a quasiduck and a judicial function is not a legislative function because it
is called a quasi-judicial function.
The New Mexico Supreme Court seems to be committed to a
strict interpretation of the separation of powers doctrine. It does
not seem likely that the court will distinguish between a function
and a power. Therefore, New Mexico will not adopt a realistic
separation of powers doctrine through judicial interpretation. The
surest way of arriving at a workable doctrine may be to amend
article 3, section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution. Deletions appear in parenthesis and additions are italicized in the following suggested amendment:
65. Sabre v. Rutland R.R. Co., 86 Vt. 347, 85 At.
added.)

693, 699 (1915).

(Emphasis
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Art. III. Distribution of Powers and Functions. The powers and
functions of the government of this state (are) shall be divided
into three (distinct) departments, the legislative, the executive, and
the judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged with the
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments,
shall exercise with finality any (powers properly belonging to)
function traditionally associated with either of the others, except as

in this Constitution otherwise expressly directed or permitted.
Obviously the suggested change is superficial. But the fact that there

would be a change would be enough to allow the court to adopt a
more realistic separation of powers doctrine.
CONCLUSION
New Mexico is handicapped by the court's strict interpretation of
the "distribution of powers" article of the New Mexico Constitution (Article 3, Section 1). The strict interpretation principle
leads to artificial or unworkable results. In the future there will
probably be an increase in the number and importance of adminis-

trative agencies. The state needs the services of such expert groups.
But the courts must be able to properly supervise the agencies by
judicial review. The strict interpretation principle hinders both of
these objectives.66 The best way to remove this artificial, doctrinal
barrier to good government is to amend article 3, section 1 of the

constitution.
THOMAS A. GARRITYt

t Member, Board of Editors, 1963-64. Member of the New Mexico Bar.
66. See notes 60 & 61 supra and accompanying text.

